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In support of new human rated spacecraft development programs, the Mission Operations
Directorate at NASA Johnson Space Center has implemented a formal method for the
assessment of spacecraft operability. This "Spacecraft Flight Operability Assessment Scale"
defines six key themes of flight operability, with guiding principles and goals stated for each
factor. A standardized rating technique provides feedback that is useful to the operations,
design and program management communities. Applicability of this concept across the
program structure and life cycle is addressed. Examples of operationally desirable and
undesirable spacecraft design characteristics are provided, as is a sample of the assessment
scale product.
L Introduction
T
HE design of a human rated spacecraft is a complex and costly process requiring the integrated assessment of
many individual criteria. Historically, it has been difficult to include in that integrated assessment the design's
Rill impact on the flight operations conununity. The unique "operability" requirements have not been well
understood, nor has there been a well-defined set of criteria for assessing operability. As programs approach their
operational phases, program managers and flight operations organizations alike are often surprised when faced with
difficult and costly operations implementations. A formal means of forecasting operability issues during the
development phases of a program is therefore necessary to reduce operations phase costs.
The challenge in addressing flight operability needs for a new program is threefold: (1) there is no accepted,
universal definition of flight operability, (2) there is no clear mapping of flight operability needs to program and
vehicle requirements, and (3) there is no formal method to assess flight operability characteristics given a spacecraft
design and mission definition. Development of a practical flight operability assessment methodology requires the
establishment of several key items. Flight operability itself must be defined in terms that are relevant both to the
flight operations community and to program management. Specific operability goals must be set, preferably as
formal design and performance requirements. Objective measures must be established to determine compliance
with those requirements.
Several organizations have attempted to define flight operability and specific associated design requirements.
The European Space Agency (ESA), NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), and NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space
Center (JSC) have all published documents intended to better specify operability needs. ESA's Space Segment
Operability Standard addresses robotic spacecraft operations safety, efficiency, and cost effectiveness but
recognized the difficulty in defining clear criteria for onboard automation capabilities.' NASA JPL defined a
similar set of design criteria for its robotic spacecraft. To document similar lessons learned for human spaceflight,
NASA JSC published its own Space Systems Operational Design Criteria Manual.' Each document provides a
valuable resource of design suggestions, but none fully encompasses the needs for human rated spacecraft nor
provides a clear process for the evaluation of real system designs against documented reconunendations.
The challenges associated with establishment of this methodology are not unlike those faced by the aircraft flight
test conununity in the 19.50's and 1960's. Over the course of twelve years, a technique for the characterization of an
aircraft's handling techniques — as assessed by the pilot operating the aircraft — was developed by George Cooper
' Deputy Chief. Constellation Systems Integration Office, Space Transportation Vehicle Division, Mission
Operations Directorate, Mail Stop DS 15.
2 Space Engineering Space Segment Operability, European Cooperation for Space Standardization, ECSS-E-70-
1IA, 5 August 2005.
' Space Systems Operational Design Criteria Manual, NASA JSC Mission Operations Directorate, 1 November
2004-
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and Robert Harper _4 The Cooper-Harper Scale has long stood as the standard tool for aircraft handling assessment.
Modified versions of this scale are employed widely in the assessment of crew equipment and interfaces for NASA
human rated spacecraft.
In response to these challenges, the Mission Operations Directorate at NASA JSC has established a formal
method for the evaluation and communication of a spacecraft system design's operational characteristics. The
spacecraft flight operability assessment method described in this paper is born of the desire to identify the operations
systems drivers and critical requirements that are a significant influence on operations cost, schedule, performance
and risk. This process is not intended to replace or replicate other critical assessments such as risk, reliability or
safety assessments. Instead, this new technique adds to a program's assessment toolset a means to address the
concerns and potential cost drivers that are unique to the operational phase of a program and the flight operations
community.
II. Flight Operability Definition
Apollo 11 flight director and former director of NASA JSC's Mission Operations Directorate Eugene Kranz
defined the flight operations infrastructure as a system designed to "Maximize mission success, to minimize risks to
the [vehicle] and the crew, to decrease operating costs, and to achieve an effective balance in the application of all
operational resources." 5 In this context, the measure of a system's fli ght operability is the measure of the de gree to
which that system enables a balance of maximum mission success, minimal risk, and minimum operating cost.
Because the flight operations community is held to the highest standards of safety and mission success, the most
variable of these factors is typically operating cost.
Any measure of fli ght operability must encompass the impact on cost, responsiveness and risk incurred in safely
executing intended operations with a spacecraft as designed and manufactured. Cost is driven by both the
developmental investments required to build the operations infrastructure (facilities, operations techniques and
products, and trained personnel prepared to execute operations), by the recurring cost of maintainin g that
infrastructure and by the expense of executing mission planning, training and operations over the entire operations
phase. Responsiveness reflects the duration over which an operation must be planned, reviewed and executed.
Excessive time requirements reduce the availability and responsiveness of operations. Risk is the likelihood of
success or failure of the operation. Additional consideration of risk must be given in the case that a failure endangers
crew health. vehicle integrity or mission success. "Operations Integration" is the practice of weighing and balancing
these factors.
Flight operability is not only a function of the vehicle design, but also the mission requirements that the system
must support. Therefore, a given system design may have different operability "scores" for different types of
mission scenarios and operations. Consider a vehicle designed solely to achieve and maintain Low Earth Orbit may
exhibit significant propellant margin in perfornung that mission. That same vehicle design may provide little or no
margin if the mission is changed to achieve and maintain a lunar orbit. Therefore, a complete measurement of flight
operability begins with the definition of the system or vehicle under study, the specific mission class, or mission
phase, or more detailed operational scenario in which operability is to be assessed. For that specific set of design
and mission conditions, an operability assessment must identify and objectively assess the key influences that
impact flight operations ability to meet safety, mission success and operating cost constraints.
M. Programmatic Impacts of Flight Operability
Although flight operability issues may be most apparent to those who execute mission planning, training, and
real-time support activities, the impact of these issues can span across an entire program infrastructure. Spacecraft
with low operability characteristics force the program, vendor, and operations communities to pursue complex
tradeoffs between cost categories. Conversely, spacecraft with high operability characteristics do not require
significant program-level operations cost tradeoffs. Consider an operability issue associated with a hazardous
condition or operation. To reduce risk of a life threatening hazard, additional time and resources are spent in the
analysis, planning, practice and execution of special procedures that nutigate the hazard. These are collectively
referred to as "operational workarounds." Failure to perform such analysis, planning, practice and diligence in
4 The Use of Pilot Rating in the Evaluation of Aircraft Handling Qualities ; George E. Cooper and Robert P. Harper, Jr., April
1969.
5 Eugene F. Kranz, STS Flight Operations — Concept versus Reality. AIAA Shuttle Environnient and Operations Conference I1;
November 1985
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execution results in greater risks should that the hazard be experienced. The implications and costs associated with
this hazard and associated operational workarounds are categorized below.
A. Engineering and real-time operations support cost impact
Program sustaining engineering costs are incurred whenever operational workarounds are invoked. For example,
the International Space Station was initially certified to fly in only a very narrow range of attitudes. However,
operational needs mandated that the spacecraft be maneuvered to and through a much wider range of attitudes in
response to testing needs, off-nominal conditions, and the constraints of other docked spacecraft. Thermal analysis
of each alternate attitude for ISS operations became a continuous task for the program throughout the program's
operations phase. The result was the need for additional personnel and tools to perform the analyses needed to
support each mission and operation.
B. Program responsiveness impact
Progrun and mission responsiveness are also reduced when operability is not provided. The constant need for
new analysis, new operations product development, and verification of these new products can cause weeks- or even
months-long delays, in addition to increased operating cost, when making even changes to mission execution.
The late discovery of multiple concerns regarding the ISS solar arrays resulted in the addition of many
conflicting operational constraints on the orientation of the arrays. The daily task of planning solar array positions
quickly changed from that of a basic capability of the flight control team to an effort requiring the constant
involvement of a much larger team including vendor and program office engineering analysts, the development of
new tools and processes; and a still evolving set of data products. The additional processes required to handle these
challenges necessarily impact the timeliness within which changes can be made.
C. Mission success impact
Program reliability is reduced when adequate operability is not provided. Dependence on operators to "close the
loop" for basic spacecraft functional capabilities leaves open the potential for human error and, in the case of
requirements levied on ground-based operators, ties spacecraft reliability to ground network and communication
satellite asset reliability. Any break in the chain of facilities and services that enable the operator to implement an
operations workaround negatively impacts the overall reliability of the integrated vehicle-ground support system.
During early International Space Station (ISS) operations ; Mission Control Center operators were required to
send hundreds of commands per day just to maintain ISS communication capability. These connnands provide
Tracking Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) pointing and selection data to onboard processors that are not able to
adequately perform automatic selection. This left the vehicle prone to potential communications outages as a result
of human error or onboard failures - that could impact science return. Again, an operational workaround could be
provided, but the cost and risk associated with the workarounds had an impact on flight operations and the program
at large.
IV. Addressing Flight Operability Issues at the Program Level
The Cooper-Harper Scale grew from a basic assessment tool to means of asserting formal operations-related
performance requirements for aircraft designers. Over the span of a dozen years, the scale was refined and applied
over a wider set of cases. Today, aircraft and spacecraft requirements documents typically specify minimum
acceptable Cooper-Harper scores. This was the result of the general acknowledgment that the assessment technique
added value, generated repeatable results, and that those results could be clearly and predictably mapped to design
characteristics.
Similarly. the definition of a formal technique for spacecraft flight operability should be viewed as an
evolutionary process, beginning with a common definition of operability definitions and assessment criteria, but
eventually reaching a common understanding that positively influences design requirements. A mature, program-
endorsed operability assessment technique therefore can be integrated into several phases of a given program life
cycle. The assessment methodology described in this paper is intended to provide a first step in the achievement of
these goals.
Operability expectations can be explicitly addressed in the development of program operations concepts,
addressing the needs associated with mission planning, training, and execution activities. The requirements
development process can be better informed through these operations concept details, and specific performance
operations-driven requirements may be derived from the definition of operability criteria. Design activities and
design reviews can benefit from operability guidelines as well as operability assessments that identify key issues
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early in the design process. Finally, the same methods may be used to assess operability of changes and upgrades to
be made during the operational phase of a program.
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Figure 1. Flight Operability considerations throughout the program life cycle
Formal flight operability assessment practices may be applied to both development and operational programs. For
development programs, the Spacecraft Flight Operability Assessment Scale can and should be employed in
generating inputs at formal design reviews (Subsystem Design Review, Prelinunary Design Review, Critical Design
Review) in less formal design team forums, and in the assessment of formal Change Requests (CRs). For
operational programs, the scale may be applied to proposed incremental vehicle changes such as hardware upgrades
and flight software updates. This includes the assessment of CRs, Problem Reports, and other notices that request or
direct operational workarounds.
Operability assessment techniques should not replace other critical evaluation methods such as operations
concern or "watch lists," Review Item Discrepancy (RID) submittals, hazard assessments or risk assessments.
Similarly, operability assessments should not replace or replicate other critical assessment techniques that address
safety, performance, and life cycle cost. Instead, operability assessment adds to those other methods by defining and
assessing the factors that are unique to the flight operations community.
V. Primary Themes in Flight Operability
Review of the many individual recoirmiendations of the flight operations community indicates six major
operability themes — simplicity, margin, robustness ; flexibility, situation awareness and control. These themes are
discussed below. Note that, if not properly balanced, these operability themes can pose conflict. Features that make
a system more robust may also make the system more complex. The judgment of subject matter experts must be
applied to strike balance in these cases.
A. Simplicity
Simplicity — often referred to with its inverse, complexity — is the collective measure not only of the functions,
interfaces and dependencies inherent in the system architecture, but also of the observations, decision and actions
required of the human operator. The number and ease of operation of functions and interfaces in the operational
environment drive the number and cost of analyses, tools, procedures, plans, constraints and training required.
Simple systems that have few dependencies and few possible system configurations generally require fewer
procedures, less training, and less effort to monitor and control.
To address operability concerns, hardware and software should be as simple as practical, minimizing the number
of unique interfaces, algorithms, and functions that require separate operational techniques to monitor and control.
Functions and interfaces should be common and consistent, requiring a reasonable number of tasks and
methodologies on the part of the operator. Tasks themselves should be simple, allowing the operator to concentrate
on decisions to be made rather than detailed operational sequences to be performed.
There are reasonable limits on the operationally desirable level of simplicity. A system that is so simple that it
does not provide the flexibility or robustness to perform in off-nominal scenarios is not operationally viable.
Careful consideration of the other operability factors should be included in an assessment of the appropriate level of
simplicity in a system.
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B. Margin
Operational margin describes the amount of capability or consumable supplies available beyond that required to
execute the mission. Operational margin provides assurance that the nominal mission may be safely executed and
allows for continued operation in the event of unexpected conditions such as malfunction or mission scenario
changes.
There are three categories of operational margin:
• Performance Margin - The ability of the system to provide greater capability than required for normal
operation or in the event of any single failure. Measures of performance margin vary by vehicle subsystem.
For example, performance margin for an electrical power system might be measured by power output
capability while the measure for a coiumunication system might be associated with the data bandwidth
sizing.
• Resource Margin - The amount of consumable commodities (propellant, atmospheric gases, stored energy)
available beyond that required to support nominal flight operations.
• Enviromuental Tolerance Margin - The system's ability to operate beyond the nominal operations
environment for a given mission profile.
Often, operational constraints and controls are required to ensure that adequate capability is available throughout
a nominal mission and after an anomaly. These constraints and controls typically impact the ability to successfully
complete all mission goals, as they limit the use of capabilities and resources even before an anomaly occurs. They
also require the addition of more techniques, tools, products and training to the operations infrastructure. All of these
additions result in increased life cycle cost. Margin is considered available for operational consideration only when
formal analysis documentation of that margin is made available to the operations community.
Lack of margin can have profound impacts on mission planning as well as real-time operations. More detailed
pre-flight analysis must be performed to ensure that Mission objectives may be met within the available resources,
that the vehicle can perform required operations within its normal performance envelope, withstand potential
anomalies, and that the flight environment does not exceed the vehicle's limits. Lack of margin not only impacts the
mission operations organization. but it also drives significant program sustaining engineering costs to provide
additional case-specific analyses that support the flight operations conuuunity as well as program strategic planning.
Flight systems should therefore provide margin in order to minimize operations constraints. Vehicle thermal,
power, and communications capabilities should not be designed with operations constraints that result in the
necessity for highly optimized mission timelines to accomplish normal operations such as rendezvous, proximity
operations, and docking. Margin in all three of these cate gories is a si gnificant driver in determining the amount and
extent of mission- and activity-specific planning and analysis. Significant positive margins in key categories should
be available in all mission phases.
At the same time, excessive margin is not operationally desirable. For example, a system that provides resource
quantities beyond any credible need may use so large a fraction of the allowable mass that fewer redundant strings
are provided in the design. Expectations on available margin should be bounded by the maximum needs for an
operational scenario (including off-nominal scenarios). In addition, care should be taken in scenarios that involve
failure "stacking" (inclusion of inultiple separate failure cases in one scenario). Credible failure scenarios include
those that would allow continued mission execution and those that would initiate the abort or early termination of a
mission. Failures after those that drive a mission abort or early termination are generally out of scope.
C. Flexibility
Flexibility is the ability of the system to accommodate change. This change can be to the mission scenario or to
the vehicle configuration. When a system is inflexible, even small changes to the mission or vehicle configuration
may require operational workarounds — additional tasks and responsibilities placed on operations personnel and
facilities. Flexibility is generally defined by the system's architecture.
Flexible flight systems should be easily reconfigured or updated to account for new conditions and new
capabilities during flight or between flights. Although this applies to both flight hardware and flight software, the
impacts of inflexible software are the more acute. Operational experience often identifies necessary changes to
limits, gains, and other parameters used by flight software. If recompilation of flight software is required to update
such parameters, then these value updates will be costly and will require months or years to incorporate.
Operational workarounds will be required for extended periods in order to account for discrepancies between the
desired and provided values.
There are reasonable limits to the desired degree of flexibility for an operable system. While some amount of
flexibility is desired to allow for slight variation in mission profile and vehicle configuration, excessive flexibility
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can result in additional operations challenges. Highly flexible systems may require more training, product
development, and manual tending than is operationally desirable or affordable.
D. Robustness
Robustness describes the system's ability to cope with changing conditions resulting from both nominal and off-
nominal operations. Flight operations planning and analysis costs are often driven by the need to "protect" the
system or vehicle from certain conditions and events. The nature and degree of these "protection" measures is
detennined by the system's or vehicle's robustness. Note that provisions such as performance mar gin and
consumables margin is assessed in a separate "margin" category. The "robustness" category addresses redundancy,
fault tolerance, cross-strapping and similar system architecture traits.
To achieve operational robustness, flight systems should be designed to maintain fail operational capability (no
loss of functionality after first failure), the design should ensure no single failure puts the nussion in to a
contingency. Systems should remain partially capable in off-nominal scenarios, allowing the continued use of
remaining functionality without requiring significant operator action to recover that functionality. In many cases,
cross-strapping - interconnections between components of two or more separate strings - are effective means for
improving robustness in off-nominal scenarios. Redundant strings should be supported by separate data and power
utility feeds to allow continued system availability after a single failure.
No time-critical operator action should be required to prevent loss of mission, crew or vehicle. Time-critical
operator actions are those that must be performed by a person within a limited time frame immediately following an
event to ensure continued safe and effective mission execution. In general, the vehicle should automatically identify
and reconfigure in response to failures that can impact mission success or crew/vehicle survival. Automated
responses should result in predictable vehicle configurations that support crew and vehicle survival.
The need for robustness is somewhat bound by the overall goals and mission scenarios that define the system
and its operation. For a given spacecraft, a set of reference missions and configurations defines cases in which the
vehicle is expected to either complete or abort the mission. Robustness should be provided to support nussion
execution within the expected bounds (including off-nominal scenarios) and to support mission abort or early
termination once the defined criteria have been met. Robustness beyond that needed for these cases may not be
warranted.
E. Situation Awareness
Situation Awareness (SA) is the ability to perceive the state of the vehicle and its operational environment, to
understand that state, and to project the future state based on that understanding. If systems do not inherently
support SA, additional operator tools and techniques may be required to provide this insight and understanding.
This may drive additional operations cost and infrastructure such as facility changes, procedures, training, or even
additional flight control team staffing. The inability  to identify specific anomalies in some scenarios may increase
risks to mission, crew and vehicle. As a result, some activities or objectives may be disallowed when SA cannot be
maintained.
Situational awareness should be assured through appropriate telemetry and caution and warning messages which
allow unambiguous detection and verification of all nonunal and off-nonunal events. Appropriate sensor locations
and quantities, as well as telemetry display/downlink capabilities should allow the operator to verify automatically
generated cues. Simple indications to the operator should be provided for failures with widespread vehicle impacts.
No false positive or false negative failure indications should be provided to the operator.
A balanced approach should be taken in assessing situation awareness. Maintaining SA requires the operator to
have an overall understanding of the system's state, capabilities and environment. Too much data can make this
understandin g almost as difficult to maintain as can too little data.
F. Control
Control measures the degree and difficulty with which the operator can direct the system's performance during
operation. This includes not only the availability of all of the control capabilities to appropriately configure the
system, but also the level of control that the operator must exercise. Use of low level commands — those that control
individual items at a fine level — may be necessary at times to accomplish specific needs. However, reliance on only
these low level conunands can result in high operator workload because each component must be individually
configured to accomplish a goal. Higher level conunands — those that cause the system to perform multiple steps to
achieve a predefined confi guration — can greatly reduce the level of difficulty in operating the system. Accordingly,
one effective measure of control is the average count of the number of conunands required to implement desired
courses of action.
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Ineffective commanding capabilities may require the development of additional ground-based software tools to
support the configuration management, processing, and issuance of commands in an effective manner. Additional
procedures may be required to support the configuration and processing of connnands. Additional training is
required to enable operators to use these tools and procedures. All of these add to the infrastructure, cost and time
associated with controlling the spacecraft.
Connmand capabilities should allow the operator to control vehicle functions by setting goals and providing
decisions when queried. Once these goals and decisions have been provided by the crew, the vehicle implements
them with little or no additional work required on the part of the crew. Routine functions (those that always involve
the same steps executed in the same order) should be automated. Where appropriate, low-level commands should
still be provided to allow for effective operations in off-nominal situations.
The system should operate and respond in a repeatable ; predictable manner to each command. The operator
should have control over the execution of automated capabilities, allowing him/her to proactively prevent or
reactively ternunate the execution of inappropriate actions. The operator should have the capability to correct the
vehicle configuration when automation either fails to do so or places the vehicle in an undesirable configuration.
Automation may be applied to address some control needs, but automation may also create other operability
challenges. In general, automation of well understood operations is achievable and operationally desirable.
However, automation of actions or responses to scenarios that are not well understood can make operations more
difficult. Where automation functions must be monitored by operators, halted as required, and replaced by operator
actions, the automation function may be operationally undesirable. Even in well understood scenarios, the
flexibility to modify automation through the use of reconfigurable scripts, settings, and other flexibility measures is
highly recommended.
G. Balancing Operability Themes
There exists a complex association of individual design characteristics with these operability factors, as
illustrated in Figure 2. The details of these associations require a more thorough discussion than can be provided in
this paper alone.
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Figure 2. Vehicle design characteristic influence on flight operability.
The complex natures of these influences, and the tendency for some of these themes to conflict, make more complex
the task of establishing formal analytic techniques for operability assessment. Just as is the case with the Cooper-
Harper scale, then, it is most prudent to rely on flight operations personnel to perform operability assessments and
assess these complex interrelationships and conflicts.
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VI. Spacecraft Flight Operability Assessment Scale Content and Structure
The flight operability assessment scale borrows elements from both the Cooper-Harper Scale and typical
program risk assessment scales, both of which are illustrated in Figure 3. The overall structure of the scale,
including its grading range — from one to ten with one being the most desirable score — is reminiscent of the Cooper-
Harper Scale's graphical layout. The more detailed textual criteria included in the scale, however, bear closer
similarity to risk assessment tools.
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Figure 3. Cooper-Harper (left) and risk assessment (right) scales.
The scale incorporates three basic elements — a set of operability themes to be evaluated, criteria with which to
evaluate each characteristic; and a grading scale to normalize the results. The operability themes correspond to the
six operability themes discussed above — simplicity, margin, flexibility, robustness, situation awareness and control.
Flight operability criteria, as shown in Figure 4, are posed to categorize assessments of each operability theme.- "Can
the mission be accomplished?" "Can it be accomplished within tolerable limits (workload, cost, risk)?" "Can it be
accomplished within normal limits?" and "To what de gree?" These four questions guide the assessor in determining
which color coded range within the possible 10 scores should be assigned for an operability theme.
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Figure 4. Operability assessment criteria.
The rating scale provides the remaining guidance — in the form of operational and program impact statements -
to select the specific rating within a category. Ratings are expressed in terms meaningful to flight operations
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personnel and to program management. Each number rating has a specific operational impact statement, as shown
in Figure 5. More generalized program impact statements are mapped to ranges of rating values as well. To provide
clear guidance regarding application of these ratings to each of the six operability factors, a set of customized
flowcharts are provided.
Operational Im pact	 Programmatic impact
Excellent operations capabilities Operationally desirable.
2 Negligible operational challenges that can be handledwith no Mission can be accomplished
noticeable impacttooperationsfeasibilityorcost Minimal operational impacts can be
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operator, but can be handled with little impactto operations and budget with negligible workload
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(manpower, facilities, products,etc.) to ensuremission success. risk. Operational impacts will change
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allocations, work prioritization, etc.
from the baseline operations plan.5 Operations are difficult and incur significant recurring costs(manpower, facilities, products, etc.) to ensure mission success.
Some mission objectives may not be achieved.
6 Operations are difficult, mission objectives may remain at risk
even afteradditonal investments (manpower, procedures, facilities,
etc.) are made.
7 Operational challenges reduce mission capability and degree of Mission is at risk.
mission success by preventing some objectives Operational impacts will exceed the
capabilities of either the operations8 Operational challenges put mission success at risk. No
operational tech niques are available to mitigate risk. community or the entire program.
9 Operational challenges increase risk of loss of crew or vehicle.
No operational techniques are available to mitigate risk while
preserving mission content.
Operationally unsafe or unachievable Not operable.
Figure 5. Operability grading criteria.
These elements — the operability themes, criteria and grading scale, are integrated into a single graphical depiction as
shown in Figure 6. In each case, both a numeric result and a textual description of strengths and deficiencies is
given. More detailed guidance for each of the six operability themes is provided in a customized version of this
graphic for the theme of interest. These more detailed graphics are included in the appendix to this paper.
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capabilities of either the operations8 operational challenges put mission sucuss at risk. No
operational techniques are available to mitigate nsk. ommunrty or the enure program.
9 Operational challenges increase risk of loss of crew or
vehicle. No operational techniques are evadable to miogate nick
while preserving misson content.
Not operable.
Grading Scale
Figure 6. Integrated elements of the Spacecraft Flight Operability Scale.
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The scale is best applied to assessment of specific flight systems or spacecraft functions, such as Guidance,
Navigation and Control (GNC) or attitude control in specific flight phases, such as ascent or docking. The scale
allows the reviewer to sunnnarize the operational impacts of one or multiple design features of those systems in
those operational scenarios. Application of this scale to individual subsystem components such as Line Replaceable
Units (LRLJs) is generally not recommended, as the operability aspects of a system involve more than just the LRU.
The software supporting that LRU; the user interface displays providing command and control for the subsystem,
and the interrelationships of that unit with other subsystem components all have a direct impact on the flight
operability. Capabilities and issues associated with each LRU can, however, be factored into the subsystem-level
assessment of flight operability.
It is important to address not only the system design itself; but also the test and verification strategy as part of
system development and delivery. While an initial design may indicate that margins exist, that a system has
adequate redundancy, or that the system performs to a given specification, none of these characteristics are truly
known unless the system is appropriately tested. The test and verification criteria should be inspected as a part of
operability assessment to ensure that design goals are met.
VII. Initial Experiences in Applying the Scale
The Mission Operations Directorate at NASA JSC has begun using this scale as a tool for both operational
vehicles such as the Space Shuttle and for new vehicle designs such as those developed under the Constellation
Program. To date, assessments of 46 Space Shuttle Orbiter subsystems have been completed for ascent; orbit and
entry scenarios. An integrated review of these results is underway to ensure consistency. Assessment of currently
operational vehicles serves to calibrate the assessment scale by identifying areas in which clearer guidance must be
given to ensure consistent evaluation results regardless of the person performing the evaluation or the system under
evaluation.
Operability Theme Score Description Operational Impact Program Impact
Multiple nominal and off nominal Complexity increases operator workload, requiring Sore inission objectives
procedures as well as operational additional tools and techniques (procedures, may be at risk.
Simplicity workarounds to disable and release constraints, etc.).
dampers indicate inherent undesirable
complexity in the system.
8 Little margin is available in the APDS Inadequate margin induces risk of loss of mission. h4ssion is at risk.
hooks. Single hook out cases drive the
need for significant system workarounds
Margin (PMA hooks, FR constraints etc).
Single point jam on the ball screw
mechanism could lead to loss of
mission.
3 The semi-automatic docking sequence Functions enabling flexibility induce additional operator 44ssion can be
Flexibility allows for much greater system workload within reasonable limits. accomplished.flexibility but also poses issues with
added training due to it's complexity.
8 Capture latches require manual Inability to recover sufficient functionality increases h4ssion is at risk.
reconfiguring after the first failure to risk of loss of mission.
Robustness return to a nominal configuration. 	 A
single point jam on the ball screw
mechanism can cause loss of mission.
3 In general, enough insight into the health Required effort to maintain Situational Awareness h4ssion can be
and operation of the docking system is results in rnnor workload impacts. accomplished.Situation available to MCC. Some coordination
Awareness with crew to attain crew only insight (A7
panel lights add to MCC workload.
3 Lack of ground control capability limits Corxrend & control interfaces and tasks impact h4ssion can be
Control MCC ability to operate the docking workload but remain in reasonable limits. accomplished.
system in off nominal situations.
Figure 7. Sample of a completed flight operability assessment for Space Shuttle docking system during orbit operations.
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An example of an assessment of a Space Shuttle subsystem in this format is shown in Figure 7. The comments
shownin this example illustrate many of the typical operational impacts of spacecraft design. The subsystem scores
relatively well in the categories of flexibility, situation awareness and control, though some limitations capabilities
are noted. However, the system's scores in simplicity, margin and robustness scores reflect the significant
operational impacts of even a single failure in the subsystem.
Initial use of this scale within the operations community has yielded encouraging results. Evaluators find the scale
easy to use, and the resulting evaluations quickly identify and isolate operability issues within specific subsystems
and scenarios. For user convenience, a pre-formatted spreadsheet form is used to assist the evaluator.
VIII. Conclusion
There is more work to be done in the development and industry-wide adoption of formal flight operability
expectations. There has been good success in initial steps to isolatin g the major criteria that define fli ght operability.
Early efforts to apply the scale to operational programs demonstrate that the scale can be applied across many
different spacecraft systems, and that the evaluation process extracts useful feedback regarding design
characteristics and operability impacts. Throu gh the continued application of this process to existing and future
programs, it is hoped that the scale and supporting material can be both matured and disseminated to a wider
audience within the aerospace connnunity.
Appendix
Graphical desictions of the Spaceflight Operability Assessment Scale and related detailed rating guidance for
indivdual operability themes are provided velow
N	
m OA
3 d x N 9 3Operational	 a	 Programt=.	 3 N
Impact	 N	 Impact
Yes
Can mission be	 No
accomplished within normal
workload, schedule,
cost & risk
limits?
Yes
Can mission be	 No
accomplished within tolerable
workload, schedule,
cost & risk
limits?
es
Can mission be	 No
accomplished safely?
1	 Excellent operations capabilities Operationally
desirable•
2	 Negligible operational challenges that can be handled with Mission can be
no noticeable impact to operations feasibility or cost accomplished
3	 Operational challenges cause noticeable nuisances to Minimal operational impacts
the operator, but can be handled with little impact to can be handled within
operations feasibility or cost. existing infrastructure and
budget with negligible
workload impacts.
4	 Operations are difficult and incur significant one time costs Some mission
(manpower, facilities, products, etc.)to ensure mission obiectiyes may be at
success. Some mission objectives may not be achieved.
risk.
Operational impacts will5	 Operations are difficult and incur significant recurring costs
(manpower, facilities, products, etc.)to ensure mission change infrastructure
success Some mission objectives may not be achieved. requirements, cost
allocations, work6	 Operations are difficult, mission objectives may remain at
riskeven afteradditional investments (manpower, prioritization, etc. from the
procedures, facilities, etc.) are made. baseline operations plan.
7	 Operational challenges reduce mission capability and Mission is at risk.degree of mission success by preventing some objectives Operational impacts will
exceed the capabilities of8	 Operational challenges put mission success at risk. 	 No
operational techniques are available to mitigate risk. either the operations
community orthe entire
program.9	 Operational challenges increase risk of loss of crew or
vehicle. No operational techniques are available to mitigate
riskwhile preserving mission content.
I Not operable.
`Operability assessment is performed for a specific reference mission or scenario
System & mission design
Figure 8. Spacecraft Flight Operability Assessment Scale.
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ves
/ Does
	
"simplicity minimizethe	 No
# of constraints, techniques
& tools to support
missions?
Yes
/ Does
	simplicity minimize	 No
excessive operational
constraints, techniques
& tools?
Ycs
^oes
simplicity minimize
	
excessive risk of loss of	 N
mission, crew
orvehicle?
System and mission design
Operationally acceptable
Required operational techniques are
Functions, interfaces and tasks require lowest
practical operator workload and infrastructure.
1
as simple as practical. Minor complexity may cause nuisances but
does not impact operator workload.
2
Minor complexity increases operator workload.
but workload remains in reasonable limits.
3
Deficiencies warrant
improvement
Complexity drives additional cost in
Complexity increases operator workload and
requires additional tools to support the
operator.
4
Complexity increases operator workload,
requiring additionaltools and techniques
CJdeveloping operations infrastructure
and may risk los of some mission
objectives. (procedures, constraints, etc.).
Complexity drives infrastructure costs, but risk
to some mission objectives remains. 6
Deficiencies require
improvement
Complexity prevents accomplishment of some
mission objectives.
7
Complexity drives operational constraintsthat
threaten mission success.
Complexity in system functions,
interfaces, or interdependencies
induce significant operational cost(excessive procedures, constraints,
training, etc) and may reduce mission
success.
Complexity drives operational constraints that
increase risk of loss of crew or vehicle. g
Improvement Mandatory
Complexity severely impacts IF
operations
Comp laxity results in unacceptable risk to 	
=
mission, vehicle and crew 1
Figure 9. Detailed guidance for assessing simplicity.
Operationally acceptable
Useful positive margin is available,
Significant useful margin is availablein mostor
all cases.
1
Some useful margin is available in most cases. 2enabling simple planning and
providing advantage in off-nominal
Slight useful margin is available in most cases. 3cases
Deficiencies warrant
improvement
Lackof margin drives additional operations
infrastructure (facility capabilities). 4
Lack of margin drives additional infrastructure
and processes (facility capabilities, analysis CJZero or negative margin in one ormore categories may cause non-
critical impacts (including loss of and procedures).
some mission objectives) either
during nominal operations or after 1 st
failure.
Additional infrastructure and processes cannot
fully mitigate risk to mission objectives. 6
Deficiencies require
improvement
Inadequate margin prevents accomplishment
of some mission objectives.
7
Inadequate margin induces risk of loss of
mission.
Lack of margin in for more categories
may cause critical impacts (potential
loss of mission, crew or vehicle)
either during norninal operations or
after 1 s ' failure.
Inadequate margin induces risk of loss of
crewlvehicle g
Improvement Mandatory
Lackofmargin will causecritical
impacts (potential loss ofcrewor
Inadequate margin is availableto execute
mission.
Positive margin
supports	 No
mission success after
first failure?
Yes
Positive margin
in all available supports 	 No
mission success after
first failure?
Yes
Sufficient
performance, resource
&environmenttoleranceto	 N
support nominal
mission?
System and mission design
Figure 10. Detailed guidance for assessing margin.
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Yes
' Does
^ovided flexibility
preventthe need for
operational
xprovidedflexibility
allow for mandatory changes
X
provided to allow
execution of a
mission?
System and mission design
Operationally acceptable
Flexibility is inherently available in the
s ystem design and interfaces.
Flight systems may be easily
reconfigured to accountfor changed
Flexibility is seamlessly provided without
requiring additional operator action.
1
Functions enabling flexibility induce nuisances
but do not impact operator workload. 2
Functions enabling flexibility induce additional
operator workload within reasonable limits.
3conditions or to incorporate new
operational techniques.
Deficiencies warrant Additional tools and infrastructure must be 4
No improvement
Necessary flexibility maybe
developed to support flexibility (data and
software reconfiguration, etc.)
Excessive procedural workarounds and
processesare required to accommodatethe
5achieved, but only with significant
additional investments.
lackof inherent system flexibility.
irFt
frastructureand procedural workarounds are
quired, but even these do not mitigate all risk 6
No some mission objectives.
Deficiencies require
improvement
Lack ofnecessaiy flexibility will resultin 
loss 
of
some mission objectives.
7
Lack of necessary flexibility induces additional
risk of loss of mission. 8
Required flexibility is not provided and
will impact mission capabilities.
Lack of necessary flexibility induces additional
risk of loss of crew or vehicle. g
Improvement Mandatory
rnflexibility prevents reconfiguration required to
safely execute missions,
Figure 11. Detailed guidance for assessing flexibility.
Ves
Cansysyl'stem
handle non-critical
No
anomalies without
interrupting ongoing
operations?
Yes
^
system properly	 No
respond to anomalies
to prevent loss of
mission?
Yes
^^Can ,\
system properly
respond to anomalies to ^,_ No
prevent loss of crew or
vehicle?
Operationally acceptable
The system makes best possible use
No further action is required of the operator
after this reconfiguration
System functionality is preserved, but non-
critical activities may be temporarily impacted
by the recovery process.
2
of remaining functionality after an
anomaly, remaining capable of
completing the mission with little or no
change to the mission plan.
System functionality is preserved, but some
activities may be interrupted until additional 3
manual steps are taken.
Deficiencies warrant
improvement
Additional operator action is required to
establish normal function after a failure
4
Operator must manually pre-configure systems
to ensure proper responseto possible failures.
5Manual proactive or reactive
measures are required to ensure
adequate system operation after a
failure. Manual pre-configuration alone cannotcompletely mitigate risks, some mission 6
Objectives remain at risk.
Deficiencies require
improvement
Inability to recover necessary
Inabilityto recover sufficient functionality
prevent completion of some mission
objectives.
7
Inabilityto recover sufficientfu notional ity
increases risk of loss of mission. 8
functionality or inappropriate
automated recovery functions
significantly impact mission success
or crew safety. Inabilityto recover sufficient functionalityincreases risk of loss of crew or vehicle 9
Jj
fai lure causes loss of crewor vehicle.
F—System and mission design
Figure 12. Detailed guidance for assessing robustness.
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Yes
Is
sufficient SA
provided to efficiently	 No
ID & respond to nominal
& off-nominal
events?
Yes
Is
sufficient SA provided	 No
to safely handle
anomalies?
Yes
Is
sufficient SA
provided to safely execute	 N
nominal mission?
System and mission design
Operationally acceptable
Telemetry and caution & warning
SA is properly maintained in all scenarioswith
no additional operator action required.
1
Minor nuisances in SA tools are noticeable but
do not add to operator workload. 2
messages allow unambiguous
detection and verification of all
nominal and off-nominal events. Required effort to maintain Situational
Awareness results in minor workload impacts.
3
Deficiencies warrant
Improvement
Additionaltools must be developedto achieve
the necessary level of Situational Awareness.
4
Additional techniques (procedures, training,
etc.) must be developedto achievethe rJ
High operator workload is required to
maintain situational awareness. Asa
result, some mission objectives may necessary level of Situational Awareness.
be at risk. Even with additional tools and techniques,
some non-critical conditions cannot be
6
effectively identified.
Deficiencies require
improvement
Data of cues required to recognize
Lack of suitable SA imposes constraints on
activities and operations, placing mission
objectives at risk.
7
Lack of suitable SA increases risk of loss of
mission due to potential operator error.
non-critical events (nominal or off-
nominal) are incorrect or not
available. Incorrect indications may
Lack of suitable SA increases risk of loss of
crew or vehicle due to potential operator error. 9
cause the operator to take actions
that threaten mission success.
Tr
^ -
Improvement Mandatory
Insufficient insightto execute a
nominal mission.
notavailable. Incorrect indicationswill cause
the operator to take inappropriate critical
actionsthat impact crewtvehicle survival.
10
Figure 13. Detailed guidance for assessing situation awareness.
Yes
1__' Do
control capabilities enable	 No
efficient execution
of tasks?
Yes
Do
control capabilities enable	 No
effective response to
contingencies?
Yes
^DOes
operator have
adequate control capability 	 N
to perform nominal
mission?
System and mission design
Operationally acceptable
All necessary control and control
Command interfaces are efficientand do not
contribute significantly to operator workload.
1
Command & control interfaces include some
nuisancesthat do not impact workload.
2functionsare provided. Required
operator control tasks are
appropriate. Command &control interfaces and tasks 3impactworkload but remain in reasonable
limits.
Deficiencies warrant
Improvement
Additional infrastructure must be developedto
supportcommand and control capabilities.
4
Extra tools and procedures are required to
achieve necessary control. 5Commands and controls are difficultto operate, impacting operator
workload and inducing additional
costs. Extra tools and techniques are required toachieve necessary control, but workload 6
impacts may impede completion of some
mission objectives,
Deficiencies require
Improvement
I nsuff icient control capability is provided to
support execution of some mission objectives.
7
I nsuff icient control capability is provided to
respond to anomalies that risk loss of mission.
Inadequate control interfaces
and methodologies impact the
Insufficient control capability is provided toability to safely and successfully
complete the mission. respond to anomalies that risk loss of 9
crew/vehicle.
Improvement Mandatory __N
Insufficient control capabilities to
	
J
execute a nominal mission.
	
.W
fControl interfaces or methodology will cause
critical impacts to nominal operations (loss of
crewtvehicle).
Figure 14. Detailed guidance for assessing control.
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Overview
• The Challenge —defining operability
• Role of Operability Assessment in a Spaceflight
Program
• Spacecraft Flight Operability Assessment Scale
Structure
• Initial Application &Lessons Learned
2
What is "Flight O
(Exactly. That's the problem. There is not a
formal definition.)
3
We face challenges similar to those faced by test
pilots and aircraft designers 40+ years ago.
• To improve aircraft designs, they needed a way to quantify the pilot's
needs and criteria for aircraft handling qualities ("Stick and rudder"
feel)
• George Cooper and Robert Harper — a test pilot and a test engineer -
devised a scale to meet this need.
— The scale evolved over a period of 12 years to become the modern version (1957-
1969)
I Handling 4ualwes hating Scale
• Today, the Cooper-Harper Scale is the standard accepted means for
specification of aircraft handling
— Even Constellation has a Cooper-Harper rating requirement.
The human spaceflight community needs a similar method to clearly
characterize flight operability — and communicate operability issues - as
we execute the design process.
4
Goal: Establish a framework for assessing operability
concerns.
• Define general operational expectations and criteria.
— Describe the key operations concerns.
— Establish criteria for evaluation of those concerns.
— Map evaluation results back to impacts on program.
• Incorporate this framework into program systems
engineering process and schedules.
— Use this framework throughout the design and review process to
organize and justify our ops inputs.
5
Affordability
Maintainability	 SustainabilityOperability
Safety Reliability
Operability assessment fit into a larger set of
processes.
• Operability issues are linked to
safety, reliability, performance,
etc .
— There are other tools available
to assess these topics
• An operability assessment tool
should not replace other
assessment tools, but rather
add to the toolset.
6
4	 4 4 4 4
Formal definitions and criteria for operability can
benefit the Program throughout its life cycle.
a^
^- U
O
+1 S-
a^
^ O
t^
0 a
a
Operations concept
definition includes
factors that impact
flight operations
System
requirements
include
operability
criteria
Operability criteria
provide clear
guidance for
design
implementation
Formal
operability
assessments
ensure
requirements
compliance
Operability
assessments
applied to
proposed
design
changesand
upgrades?
there have been several attempts to define
operability...
JPL
Design
Principles
Document
JSC
Flight
Operations
Improvement
Team (FOIT)
Report
JSC
Human Space
Systems
Operational
Design Criteria
Manual
(John
Commonsense)
ESA
ECSS
Standard
on Space
Segment
Operability
...but it remains difficult to establish formal
requirements that completely reflect these needs.
8
Why not use an existing scale like...
...Cooper Harper?
— Assessment requires availability of a simulator to
perform evaluation.
— Only directly address the real-time aspect of
mission operations ("Fly" vs. "Plan-Train-Fly").
Handling Qualilie Rating Scale
...or a risk matrix?
— Too generalized to completely reflect operability
drivers.
But we can use ideas from both in building an
operability scale.
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There are three key elements to this framework:
Operability Factors
• Capture the general factors that drive ops complexity
• Include description of desired characteristics in each theme
Criteria
• General questions that characterize operations impact
• Can be customized for each theme
Grading scale
• Define the range of possible scores and their implications to ops and the
program
• The resulting grades must have meaning for both the operations
community and the program management community.
These elements are applied to a system design for a specific design
reference mission or task
10
Six operability factors capture the range of operational
concerns.
• Simplicity	 Commonality and consistencySimple functions and interfaces
Simple tasks
Performance margin
• Marging	 Resource margin
Environmental tolerance (temperature, radiation, etc.)
Easy reconfiguration
•	 Flexibility
	
Ability to make minor updates (limits, control gains, etc.)
Ability to upgrade through life cycle
Fail operational
Graceful degradation
• Robustness	 Appropriate automation time-critical reconfiguration
telemetry and caution & warning
• Situational Sensor locations and quantities
Awareness	 Simple indications for the operator
Command capabilities
• Controllability	 Control of automated capabilitiesSystems operate in a repeatable, predictable manner. 	 11
Operational
Constraints
Reactive
Reconfiguratic
active
-onfiguration
Margin
Flexibility
Simplicity
Robustness
- Control
Situation
Awareness
There are many complex relationships between design
characteristics, operability factors, and resultin
^ et
program impact.
Vehicle Design	 Operability	 Operational	 Program
Characteristics 	 Impacts	 Response	 Operational * ImpactImpact
Environment
Tolerance
Consumable
resource storage
capacity
Renewable
resource storage
capacity
Performance
Analysis Data
Availability
System Architecture
& Connectivity
Redundancy
& Reliability
Hazards
Automation
Command
Interfaces
Instrumentation
Communication
Bandwidth
Life Cycle
Cost
& Mission
Success
Flt Procedure
Quantity &
Complexity
(risk, time, cost)
Analysis Task
Quantity &
Complexity
(risk, time, cost)
Analysis Tool
Needs (cost)
Preflight
Planning
complexity
(risk, time, cost)
-raining Needs
(time, cost)
Caution & Warning	 12
General criteria apply to all themes.
Yes
Can mission be
accomplished within normal 	 No
workload, schedule,
\
sto &risk
limits?
Operationally
acceptable
Ideal 1 Ideal
Below this point,
anticipated capabilities or
budget levels are not
ppSu	 ortable
Negligible issues 2
Nuisance issues 3
Deficiencies
warrant
improvement
Some impact 4
Moderate impact 5
Significant impact 6
Yes
Some impact 7
Moderate impact 8
Significant impact 9
Can mission be	 No	 Deficiencies
accomplished within tolerable 	 require
orkload, cost, schedule	 improvement
& risk limits?
Yes
Can mission be
accomplished safely? 	 No
System and mission design
1:1
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The grading scale translates results into ops and
program impacts.
Operational Impact	 Programmatic impact
1 Excellent operations capabilities Operationally desirable.
2 Negligible operational challenges that can be handled with no Mission can be accomplished
noticeable impact to operations feasibility or cost Minimal operational impacts can be
handled within existing infrastructure3 Operational challenges cause noticeable nuisances to the
operator, but can be handled with little impact to operations and budget with negligible workload
feasibility or cost. impacts.
4 Operations are difficult and incur significant one time costs Some mission objectives may be at
(manpower, facilities, products, etc.) to ensure mission success. risk. Operational impacts will change
Some mission objectives may not be achieved. infrastructure requirements, cost
allocations, work prioritization, etc.
from the baseline operations plan.5 Operations are difficult and incur significant recurring costs(manpower, facilities, products, etc.) to ensure mission success.
Some mission objectives may not be achieved.
6 Operations are difficult, mission objectives may remain at risk
even after additional investments (manpower, procedures, facilities,
etc.) are made.
7 Operational challenges reduce mission capability and degree of Mission is at risk.
mission success by preventing some objectives Operational impacts will exceed the
capabilities of either the operations8 Operational challenges put mission success at risk. No
operational techniques are available to mitigate risk. community or the entire program.
9 Operational challenges increase risk of loss of crew or vehicle.
No operational techniques are available to mitigate risk while
preserving mission content.
Operationally unsafe or unachievablep	Y Not operable.
Themes, criteria and grading scale are integrated
into an evaluation table.
oy M O D
'^O m
CDX
y N
O
(Q 6
6
y NN WN K
Themes
Proqram Impact
Criteria
Operational
Impact
Excellent operations capabilities Operation 11V desirable.
2 Negligible operational challenges that can be handled with no Mission can be accomplished
noticeable impact to operations feasibility or cost Minimal operational impacts can be
handled within existing infrastructure and
3 Operational challenges cause noticeable nuisances to the budget with negligible workload impacts.
operator, but can be handled with little impact to operations
feasibility or cost.
4 Operations are difficult and incur significant one time costs Some mission objectives may be at
risk.(manpower, facilities, products, etc.) to ensure mission success.
Some mission objectives may not be achieved. Operational impacts will change
infrastructure requirements, cost
5 Operations are difficult and incur significant recurring costs(manpower, facilities, products, etc.) to ensure mission success allocations, work prioritization, etc. from the
Some mission objectives may not be achieved. baseline operations plan.
6 Operations are difficult, mission objectives may remain at risk
even after additional investments (manpower, procedures,
facilities, etc.) are made.
7 Operational challenges reduce mission capability and degree Mission is at risk.
of mission success by preventing some objectives Operational impacts will exceed the
capabilities of either the operations8 Operational challenges put mission success at risk. No community or the entire program..
operational techniques are available to mitigate risk.
9 Operational challenges increase risk of loss of crew or
vehicle. No operational techniques are available to mitigate risk
while preserving mission content.
FU . , Not operable.
Yes
Can mission be	 No
accomplished within normal
\
rkload, schedule,
cost & risk
Yes
Can mission be
accomplished within tolerable
workload, schedule,
cost & risk 
Yes
Can mission be
accomplished safely?
System & mission design
Grading Scale
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Operational
Impact
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Program
Impact
1	 Excellent operations capabilities Operationally
desirable.
2	 Negligible operational challenges that can be handled with Mission can be
no noticeable impact to operations feasibility or cost accomplished
3	 Operational challenges cause noticeable nuisances to Minimal operational impacts
the operator, but can be handled with little impact to can be handled within
operations feasibility or cost. existing infrastructure and
budget with negligible
workload impacts-
0 4	 Operations are difficult and incur significant one time costs Some mission(manpower, facilities, products, etc.) to ensure mission objectives may be at
success. Some mission objectives may not be achieved.
risk.
5	 Operations are difficult and incur significant recurring costs Operational impacts will(manpower, facilities, products, etc.) to ensure mission change infrastructure
success Some mission objectives may not be achieved. requirements, cost
6	 Operations are difficult, mission objectives may remain at allocations, workrisk even after additional investments (manpower, prioritization, etc. from the
procedures, facilities, etc.) are made. baseline operations plan.
^o 7	 Operational challenges reduce mission capability and Mission is at risk.
degree of mission success by preventing some objectives Operational impacts will
8	 Operational challenges put mission success at risk. No exceed the capabilities of
operational techniques are available to mitigate risk. either the operations
community or the entire
9	 Operational challenges increase risk of loss of crew or program.
vehicle. No operational techniques are available to mitigate
vo risk while preserving mission content.
• •	 -	 • • - Not operable.
Yes
Can mission be
accomplished within normal
workload, schedule,
cost & r?
limits?
Yes
e-.*" 
Can mission be \
accomplished within tolerable
workload, schedule,
cost & risk
limits?
Yes
Can mission be
accomplished safely?
*Operability assessment is performed for a specific reference mission or scenario	 16
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For each operability theme, more detailed guidance is given
(Example — margin)
Yes
Operationally acceptable
Useful positive margin is available,
Significant useful margin is available in most or
all cases.
1
Some useful margin is available in most cases. 2enabling simple planning and
providing advantage in off-nominal
Slight useful margin is available in most cases. 3cases.
Positive margin
supportsNo
mission success after
first failure?
Yes
--' Positive margin
in all available supports	 No
mission success after
\	 first failure?
I System and mission design
Deficiencies warrant Lack of margin drives additional operations 4
improvement infrastructure (facility capabilities).
Lack of margin drives additional infrastructure 5Zero or negative margin in one or
more categories may cause non- and processes (facility capabilities, analysis
critical impacts (including loss of and procedures).
some mission objectives) either	
st Additional infrastructure and processes cannot
6during nominal operations or after 1 fully mitigate risk to mission objectives.
failure.
Deficiencies require Inadequate margin prevents accomplishment 7
improvement of some mission objectives.
Inadequate margin induces risk of loss of 8Lack of margin in 1 o more categoriesmay cause critical impacts (potential mission.
loss of mission, crew or vehicle)
either during nominal operations or Inadequate margin induces risk of loss of 9
after 1 st failure. crew/vehicle.
Rm' provement Mandatory
Lack of margin will cause critical Inadequate margin is available to execute
impacts (potential loss of crew or	 ,
,,yehicle)
ission.
KL==	 ^^Ai
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Yes
/Sufficient
performance, res
>to& environment tole
port nomi
mission?
Initial Application &Lessons Learned
Establishing a baseline for future assessments
• Executed an initial operability assessment
of Space Shuttle flight systems
— This was the first real exercise, using well
understood design and a wealth of
operational experience.
— Provided guidance and criteria for
assigning operability scores, but recognized
that this first attempt would show
variations form reviewer to reviewer
• Goals
— Identify the major gaps in defined criteria
— Explore possible interpretations of the
criteria as written
— Begin working towards a consistent
approach for all technical disciplines.
Scope of Space Shuttle Assessment
• Six major flight systems (with a total of
46 subsystems contained therein)
—Communications
— ECLSS
— EPS
—GNC
— Mechanical
— Propulsion
• Three major mission scenarios
—Ascent
— Orbit	 High degree of
—Entry	
similarity
Initial Application
Example —Evaluation of Shuttle Docking system for on-orbit operations
Operability Theme Score	 Description Operational Impact Program Impact
5 Multiple nominal and off nominal Complexity increases operator workload, requiring Some mission objectives
procedures as well as operational additional tools and techniques (procedures, may be at risk.
Simplicity workarounds to disable and release constraints, etc.).
dampers indicate inherent undesirable
complexity in the system.
8 Little margin Is available In the APDS Inadequate margin induces risk of loss of mission. Mission is at risk.
hooks.	 Single hook out cases drive the
need for significant system workarounds
Margin (PMA hooks, FR constraints etc).
Single point jam on the ball screw
mechanism could lead to loss of
mission.
3 The semi-automatic docking sequence Functions enabling flexibility induce additional operator Mission can be
Flexibility allows for much greater system workload within reasonable limits. accomplished.flexibility but also poses issues with
added training due to it's complexity.
8 Capture latches require manual Inability to recover sufficient functionality increases Mission is at risk.
reconfiguring after the first failure to risk of loss of mission.
Robustness return to a nominal configuration. 	 A
single point jam on the ball screw
mechanism can cause loss of mission.
3 In general, enough Insight Into the health Required effort to maintain Situational Awareness Mission can be
and operation of the docking system is results in minor workload impacts. accomplished.Situation available to MCC. Some coordination
Awareness with crew to attain crew only insight (A7panel lights add to MCC workload.
3 Lack of ground control capability limits Command & control interfaces and tasks impact Mission can be
Control MCC ability to operate the dockingL
workload but remain in reasonable limits. accomplished.
I system in off nominal situations.
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Lessons Learned
• Defining flight operability is non-trivial. But Important.
• Development — and adoption — of a formal technique
will take time.
• So far...
— General acceptance of operability theme definitions in
flight operations community
— Evaluation process generates findings that can benefit
future programs
— Well received by program and development communities
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